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Enterprises
Introduction
Privatization in China took off with the 
transformation of ownership at small and me-
dium stated-owned and collective enterprises 
under the jurisdiction of local governments. 
With political constraints over privatization of 
small and medium enterprises eased substan-
tially in the latter half of the 1990s, privatiza-
tion movements driven by local governments 
moved into high gear extensively. It is expect-
ed that privatization of small and medium en-
terprises will largely be completed in the not 
so distant future.
The progress in privatization is bring-
ing with it changes in the form of privatiza-
tion. In the early years of privatization, the 
transformation of state-owned and collective 
enterprises into employee-owned enterpris-
es with egalitarian distribution of ownership 
accounted for a majority of privatization cas-
es. In recent years, however, control of capital 
by management and buyouts by private-sector 
enterprises are becoming the prevalent forms 
of privatization.
In this chapter, the progress in privatiza-
tion of urban small and medium state-owned 
and collective enterprises is analyzed main-
ly on the basis of fi eld studies conducted in 
1999-2001. Small and medium state-owned 
and collective enterprises accounted for only 
about 20% of China's mining and manufac-
turing sector as of 1995, keeping the immedi-
ate impact of their privatization small relative 
to that of village and township enterprises. 
With the waves of privatization surging to hit 
enterprises with larger scale, however, the dy-
namics of ownership transformation seen 
in privatization of small and medium state-
owned and collective enterprises has started 
to infl uence privatization of middle-scale or 
larger state-owned and collective enterprises. 
The analysis of privatization of small and me-
dium state-owned and collective enterprises is 
of great signifi cance in fi nding a clue to the 
future course of privatization of large enter-
prises.1
2.1 Accelerating Privatization of 
Small and Medium Scale
Enterprises
2.1.1 Backdrop of Privatization:
         Rising Competitive Pressure 
(1) Overview of Small and Medium State-
Owned and Collective Enterprises
In Chinese industrial statistics, the siz-
es of enterprises are classifi ed into large, me-
dium and small, based on the size of pro-
duction capacity or fi xed assets by industry 
sector.2 The average number of employees 
at small state-owned enterprises is a little less 
than 180, roughly corresponds to the conven-
tional norms of small and medium enterpris-
es in many other countries. Medium enter-
prises cover a broad spectrum of enterprises 
in size, with medium enterprises with a rela-
tively small size actually being little more than 
small enterprises.
By form of ownership, a majority of 
state-owned enterprises which come under 
the jurisdiction of county or district govern-
ments as well as urban collective enterprises 
are small enterprises, or medium enterpris-
es with a relatively small size. Here we assume 
for convinience that all the three forms of 
small state-owned enterprises, state-owned en-
terprises under the jurisdiction of county and 
district governments, and urban collective en-
terprises fall under the category of small and 
medium state-owned and collective enterpris-
es, Profi le of these enterprises at the time of 
the third industrial census of 1995 is given 
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in Table 1. For each of the three forms, the 
profi t rate is substantially lower than the aver-
age for the entire mining and manufacturing 
sector or the average for state-owned and col-
lective enterprises.
(2) Deterioration of Business amid Mounting 
Competitive Pressure
Privatization of small and medium state-
owned and collective enterprises was initially 
triggered by the deterioration of business as 
the ineffi ciency of management made them 
unable to compete with village and township 
enterprises or private-sector enterprises amid 
mounting competitive pressure.
Since the mid-1980s, competitive pres-
sure intensifi ed with the increased entry by 
village and township enterprises and others 
mainly into labor-intensive industries with rel-
atively low barriers to entry. This dealt a heavy 
blow to less competitive small state-owned en-
terprises and urban collective enterprises, and 
their profi t rate began to slide. After a tempo-
rary recovery due to the economic boom in 
1992-1993, the profi t rate at state-owned en-
terprises declined further during the 1990s. 
In particular, small enterprises suffered a pro-
nounced deterioration (Figure 1).3 In 1994 
onward, small state-owned enterprises as a 
whole slipped into the position of net loss, 
where their combined losses exceeded com-
bined profi ts. The profi t rate for medium en-
terprises is slightly higher than that for small 
enterprises, but the downtrend of their profi t 
is still quite similar.
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Table 1  Summary Statistics of State-owned and Urban Collective Enterprises
              (Based on the Third Industrial Census in 1995)
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Figure 1 Return on Sales of State-owned 
               Enterprises by Size 
               (The Industrial Sector)
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2.1.2 Start and Full-Blown Progress 
of Privatization
(1) Start of Voluntary Privatization
Privatization of small and medium state-
owned and collective enterprises started as 
voluntary steps by local governments.4 With 
Deng Xiaoping's "Southern Tour Lectures" 
of 1992 and the establishment of the socialist 
market economy policy at the third Plenum 
of the 14th Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China (CPC) in 1993 as the 
trigger, county and city governments in such 
provinces as Sichuan, Shandong and Guang-
dong embarked on privatization of enterpris-
es under their jurisdiction. 
The party leadership effectively permit-
ted privatization of small and medium enter-
prises with the decision at third Plenum of 
the 14th Central Committee of the CPC, but 
did not set out concrete guidelines for the 
scope of enterprises subject to privatization 
or specifi c methods of privatization. Ideologi-
cal resistance to privatization was far from re-
moved, and pushing ahead with the sale of 
state-owned and collective enterprises still in-
volved great political risks.
However, there were pressing circum-
stances on the part of local governments that 
set about privatization. In the case of Yibin 
Country in Sichuan Province, one of the fi rst 
local governments that started the privatiza-
tion process, over 70% of a total of 66 state-
owned enterprises under the jurisdiction of 
the country authorities were operating in 
the red as of 1991, with their combined loss-
es amounting to 40 million RMB a year to ex-
ceed the country's total annual revenue.5 The 
deterioration of profi ts at state-owned en-
terprises, the biggest source of tax revenue 
then, was nothing short of the "fatal blow" to 
the county's fi nances. There was the high fre-
quency of protest actions by workers in ailing 
public enterprises for substantial delays in sal-
ary payments, but the county government sim-
ply lacked fi nancial means to bail out these 
enterprises. Amid these circumstances, the 
Yibin County government launched into the 
sale and privatization of state-owned enter-
prises from around 1990, without obtaining 
the offi cial authorization of Yibin City, its su-
perior administrative unit. Local governments 
that started privatization in the fi rst half of 
the 1990s were confronted with more or less 
similar circumstances. 
(2) From the Wait-and-See to Approval and 
Promotion
At fi rst, provincial governments and the 
central government took a wait-and-see atti-
tude toward voluntary privatization measures 
by local governments. With the growing rec-
ognition of the favorable results of privati-
zation later, provincial governments eventu-
ally authorized privatization and expanded 
the scope of enterprises subject to privatiza-
tion. In Sichuan Province, for example, the 
fi rst Provincial Conference on the Reform of 
Small and Medium State-owned Enterprises in 
Sichuan was held in 1994, where the decision 
was made to push for reform of state-owned 
enterprises under county governments on the 
model of Yibin County. The second confer-
ence in 1995 adopted the policy to complete 
the reform in three years by 1997.
The party leadership virtually autho-
rized the local government-led privatization 
of small and medium enterprises through 
the "Grasp the large and liberalize the small 
(Zhua da fang xiao)" policy in 1995-1996 and 
the speech by General Secretary Jiang Zemin 
at the 15th Party Congress in 1997. The third 
Plenum of the 15th Central Committee of the 
CPC in 1999 reaffi rmed this policy, and em-
phasized the need to facilitate the exit of state 
capital from ordinary industries and the con-
centration on strategic areas. With the polit-
ical constraints all but removed, movements 
toward privatization of small and medium en-
terprises have since accelerated further. From 
late 1999 through 2000, major cities such as 
Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing adopted plans 
for or decided on the promotion of the exit 
of government capital (meaning privatiza-
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tion) from small and medium enterprises. In 
2001, some provincial governments, including 
Sichuan and Jilin, announced comprehensive 
programs for the consolidation of state-owned 
enterprises by means mainly of privatization 
and liquidation.6
(3) Progress in Privatization
There has been no systematic data made 
publicly available on the progress in privati-
zation in China, but decrease in the number 
of state-owned enterprises in offi cial statistics 
provide a clue. The number of state-owned 
enterprises in the mining and manufacturing 
sector declined rapidly from 1995 after peak-
ing in the fi rst half of the 1990s (Table 2).7
The decline in the number of enterprises due 
to mergers or bankruptcies in the sector is es-
timated to have reached 1,000 to 2,000 each 
year. Given this estimate, the downtrend of 
the number of enterprises shown in Table2 
can be interpreted as largely indicating the 
progress in privatization.
From 1997, when the 15th Party Con-
gress was held, to 1998, the number of state-
owned enterprises decreased by more than 
20,000.8 While the pace of decrease in the 
number of state-owned enterprises slowed 
from 1998 to 1999, the number of state-owned 
enterprises fell close to half of the peak level 
by 2001.
The pace of decline in the number of 
state-owned enterprises greatly varies by re-
gion. Provincial statistics show that the num-
ber of state-owned enterprises dropped over 
60% in Sichuan and other inland provinc-
es from 1995 through 2001, while the num-
ber of state-owned enterprises displayed little 
change in major cities in the coastal region, 
including Tianjin.
2.2 Current Status of Privatization of 
Small and Medium Scale 
Enterprises
2.2.1 Modes and Characteristics of 
Privatization
(1) Various Modes of Corporate System Re-
form
In China, various modes of the restruc-
turing of the corporate system, including 
privatization, are generically called "institu-
tional reforms (Gaizhi)." The institutional re-
forms include reforms in the form of leasing 
and contracting that do not involve owner-
ship changes.
During the incipient phase of privati-
zation in the fi rst half of the 1990s, conver-
sion into joint stock cooperatives owned by 
employees was the dominant mode of priva-
tization in the true sense of the word that en-
tailed ownership changes. But joint stock co-
operative as a mode of company have one 
crucial fl aw: if lacks well-developed legal 
grounds. Since the latter half of the 1990s 
when privatization moved into high gear, pri-
vate limited companies increasingly replaced 
joint stock cooperatives as the principal mode 
of conversion into enterprises owned by em-
ployees. Buyouts by private enterprises or in-
dividual business men have been increasing 
in recent years,9 though they still account for 
only a minority of the total number of privati-
zation cases.
Table 2 The Number of State-owned 
             Enterprises in the Industrial Sector   
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(2) Current State of Privatization 
The Institute of Developing Economies 
(IDE) visited 15 privatized enterprises in Sich-
uan Province in 1999 to survey the progress 
of privatization of small and medium state-
owned and collective enterprises. Later, from 
1999 through 2001, the author also visited 11 
privatized enterprises (including those with 
plans for privatization) in Chongqing of Sich-
uan Province, Zhenjiang of Jiangsu Province 
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and some other cities. These samples of priva-
tized enterprises presumably represent the 
overall trend of privatization of small and me-
dium state-owned and collective enterprises.10
On the basis of these fi eld surveys, the status 
of privatization in China is examined below 
(Privatization modes of the samples are out-
lined in Table 3). The survey samples include 
nine mid-size (with the work force in excess 
of 500) enterprises and fi ve collective enter-
prises.
Privatization by Employee Ownership
Privatization through the conversion 
into employee ownership is the most widely 
seen mode of privatization for small and me-
dium enterprises. This mode of privatization 
accounted for about two-thirds (17 enterpris-
es) of the survey samples. Among enterpris-
es that became privatized by 1996, the major-
ity of them (11 out of 13 enterprises) opted 
for the ownership by employees. The privati-
zation through the conversion into employee 
ownership is offi cially regarded as a form of 
collective ownership, i.e., workers' ownership, 
thus presenting few ideological problems and 
minimizing resistance by employees. Thus, in 
the early years of privatization of small and 
medium enterprises, the administrative au-
thorities actively encouraged these enterpris-
es to shift into employee-owned enterprises, 
while the central government, at least at fi rst, 
also gave the blessing to the conversion to em-
ployee ownership. For almost all of the enter-
prises surveyed which had been turned into 
employees' ownership, the conversion was 
made by adopting the corporate form of pri-
vate limited company (youxian zeren gongsi).11
There are roughly two methods of turn-
ing enterprises into employee-owned: one 
is for the relatively equitable distribution 
of equity among all employees and the oth-
er is for the concentrated allocation of equi-
ty to managers and management staff. Yibin 
City(including Yibin County) of Sichuan Prov-
ince, which was one of the fi rst to start the 
privatization drive, pursued an egalitarian ap-
proach to employee ownership, which limit-
ed the gap in equity ratios to a maximum of a 
few times in order to mitigate employees' an-
tipathy toward privatization.12 Typical exam-
ples of this approach include Weili Chemical 
Engineering (fully equal distribution of shares 
at the initial state of privatization) and Yibin 
Electric Machinery (the equity share of man-
agers limited to three times the combined 
share of ordinary employees). At Weili Chem-
ical Engineering and Fenghuang Packaging 
Materials, corporate managers at fi rst tried to 
gain dominant share in equity upon privatiza-
tion, but failed to do so due to the resistance 
by employees. The above-described approach 
seems to have been adopted by many local 
governments up to some point, and the cen-
tral government was also of the position, until 
around the 1997 guidelines, that the excessive 
disparity of equity shares was "undesirable."
However, Dachuan City, which followed 
Yibin City to embark on privatization, took 
an approach that from the beginning provid-
ed managers and management with a great-
er equity shares. At Yibin Food, the fi rst case 
of privatization in Dachuan, members of the 
board of directors (dongshihui) alone own a 
combined 20% of capital. In later cases of 
privatization, the egalitarian approach for em-
ployee ownership, adopted for Weili Chemical 
Engineering and Yeibin Electric Machinery in 
Yibin City, was rarely seen, with a majority of 
privatization cases involving the distribution 
of equity shares tilted toward managers and 
management.
At most of employee-owned enterpris-
es, pre-privatization management teams have 
been retained, with few rather exceptional 
cases involving the major shakeup of manage-
ment.
Buyout by Private Enterprises
Most of privatization cases through the 
buyout by private enterprises occurred after 
1996. The fact that the political climate sur-
rounding private enterprises turned favorable 
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at the time is believed to have contributed to 
the realization of privatization through the 
buyout.
In the cases of Shenghe Pharmaceu-
ticals, Meihao Food  and Suzhou Testing 
Equipment, all of which were insolvent or in 
near-insolvency at the time of privatization, 
the private-sector buyers did not wait for the 
completion of bankruptcy procedures before 
the acquisition, an irrational action on the 
face of it (For Meihao Food, the acquired en-
terprise and Hope Group, the buyer, set up a 
joint venture). This can be explained princi-
pally by the potential value the buyers saw in 
the enterprises being purchased as well as pol-
icy measurers accorded to the buyers by local 
governments to alleviate their fi nancial bur-
dens.
In the case of Shenghe Pharmaceu-
ticals, the private-sector acquirer, Yihe Co., 
whose principal business was the distribution 
of pharmaceuticals products, wanted to ex-
pand into production operations but opted 
for the acquisition of an existing drug maker 
because of the regulation at that time that did 
not allow a pure private entity to go into drug 
manufacturing. In the case of Meihao Food, 
the purchaser, Hope Group, wanted to enter 
the local market by taking over management 
assets of the enterprise being acquired. In ei-
ther case, local governments shouldered 30% 
to 60% of debts owed by the enterprises ac-
quired to reduce the burdens on the purchas-
ing companies. In the case of Suzhou Testing 
Equipment, the buyer was attracted by the po-
tential value Suzhou Testing Equipment of-
fered in terms of technology and facilities as a 
long-established testing equipment maker as 
well as its cooperative business ties with a ma-
jor Japanese manufacturer. The local govern-
ment reduced the buyer's burden by lowering 
the valuation of assets being acquired.
Bankruptcy procedures
Local governments tended to avoid 
bankruptcy proceedings for struggling small 
and medium enterprises because of big prob-
lems associated with the treatment of workers 
at bankrupt enterprises. The survey samples 
include only two bankruptcy cases, Chang-
ming Machinery and Wenjun Tea. Both of 
them were in extremely bad shape, with actu-
al business operations shut down, at the time 
of privatization.
Even when state-owned enterprises 
are effectively insolvent, there are instances 
where they do not become subject to bank-
ruptcy proceedings because of the unwilling-
ness to do so on the part of creditor fi nancial 
institutions. In the case of tile maker Dachuan 
Ruichang Ceramics, the former state-owned 
entity had problems in terms of both the loca-
tion of operations and technology it had from 
the beginning, and became insolvent before 
the launch of normal operations. The meth-
od of relief adopted was to lease its assets to 
Ruichang Co., a private enterprise, while the 
state-owned entity continued to exist. The lo-
cal government still wants to dispose of the 
state-owned enterprise through bankruptcy 
proceedings, but it has yet to obtain the con-
sent of creditor banks. In China, courts are 
under the infl uence of local authorities, and 
bankruptcy proceedings are often found to 
go against creditors. Therefore, branches of 
state-owned banks that manage loans to in-
solvent enterprises are more often than not 
loath to bankruptcy proceedings that force 
them to realize latent losses. 
Recently, however, government authori-
ties have become more proactive in pursuing 
the bankruptcy of insolvent public enterpris-
es as part of the disposal of nonperforming 
loans held by state-owned banks. In Hang-
zhou, which began privatization in earnest in 
1998, the municipal authorities resorted to 
bankruptcy proceedings for 30 (17.5%) of a 
total of 171 state-owned mining and manu-
facturing enterprises under the local govern-
ment's jurisdiction by October 2001. Still, the 
constraints blocking bankruptcy proceedings 
remain in force. In Hangzhou, the govern-
ment is still unable to take bankruptcy pro-
ceedings for 24 insolvent enterprises because 
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of the reluctance of creditor banks and other 
reasons.13 Given the extent of the deteriora-
tion of management conditions at many small 
and medium state-owned and collective en-
terprises, however, the number of enterprises 
to be subjected to bankruptcy proceedings is 
highly likely to increase going forward.
Local Government Measures for Promoting Priva-
tization
Privatization of ailing small and medi-
um state-owned and collective enterprises en-
tails enormous diffi culties. In order to help 
reduce the fi nancial burdens on employees 
or outside companies interested in the acqui-
sition of these enterprises, local governments 
are offering a variety of preferential measures 
to encourage the privatization process. 
The most widely used practice is to set 
the selling price at a level lower than the val-
ue of assets held by an enterprise on the 
block calculated by asset valuation. In the case 
of employees' buyout, they are allowed to pay 
for the acquisition in installments over sever-
al years, or a deep discount of around 20% is 
given for a lump-sum payment in cash. Part of 
net assets of a privatized enterprise is often al-
located to employees free of charge by recog-
nizing their contribution to the past profi ts as 
sort of capital contributions. In the case of Ji-
angjin Brewery, as much as nearly 50% of its 
net assets was distributed to employees on a 
gratis basis. As a rule, these allocations are dif-
ferentiated according to the length of service, 
and job titles.
Employees of state-owned enterprises 
had been customarily assured of stable em-
ployment. Even when personnel reductions 
were necessary, employer enterprises and lo-
cal governments were required to help work-
ers being released fi nd other jobs. Priva-
tization means employees of state-owned 
enterprises lose generous job guarantees, and 
this is the biggest and foremost reason why 
they resist privatization. In order to promote 
privatization, local governments sometimes 
offer a discount to the sales price for privati-
zation through employee ownership as a com-
pensation for the loss of job guarantees.
Dachuan City, that followed Yibin City 
in the privatization drive in Sichuan Province, 
obtained the provincial government's designa-
tion as an experimental area to implement its 
policy of deducting the standard amount of 
7,000 RMB per employee as the "job remedi-
al allowance"14 from the sale price when state 
assets are sold to employees. For the privati-
zation of Yueliang Food, the fi rst to be priva-
tized in Dachuan City in 1994, nearly 50% 
of its net assets were covered by these deduc-
tions. For Lansen Daily Chemicals, privatized 
in the following year, the standard deduction 
was raised to 12,000 RMB per employee as the 
enterprise's past record of relatively strong 
earnings was taken to mean employees' "great 
contribution to the state."
Sichuan Provincial Government accept-
ed the deduction of "job remedial allowanc-
es" as the "cost associated with reform." With 
Dachuan City setting a precedent, many oth-
er counties in Sichuan Province began to sell 
off state assets at discount prices, facilitating 
privatization via the ownership by employees. 
Similar methods have now been adopted in 
other regions as well.
As explained earlier, when deeply trou-
bled enterprises are sold off, local govern-
ments offer various support measures, includ-
ing the assumption of debts. There have been 
some cases where insolvent public enterpris-
es have been sold to outside companies for 
free15. In providing privatization support, lo-
cal governments often require the continued 
employment of a certain percentage of em-
ployees.
One of important issues involved in 
privatization is the protection of claims on en-
terprises being privatized. The problems with 
newly established companies refusing to hon-
or the liabilities of former public enterprises 
appear to be growing serious.16 The Provincial 
government of Sichuan makes it mandatory 
for creditor banks to participate in the priva-
tization process in order to preserve bank 
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claims. There are cases where bank claims on 
privatized enterprises are reduced after local 
governments get involved in negotiations with 
creditor banks.
Reduction of Redundant Labor
State-owned enterprises in general have had 
excess personnel equivalent to some 20 to 
30% of labor. Whether redundant workers 
can be reduced upon privatization or soon af-
ter privatization have a major bearing on the 
performance of privatized enterprises. 
In Yibin City that went ahead with priva-
tization through employee ownership fairly 
ahead of other regions, privatized enterpris-
es have not reduced much of workforce. In 
the case of Yibin Electric Machinery, it wanted 
to cut 3% of personnel at the time of priva-
tization. As the local government refused to 
authorize the reduction, the company was 
forced to accept the compromise that called 
for an annual reduction by 2%. At the time of 
the survey in 1999, three years after the priva-
tization, the company was still burdened with 
surplus labor equivalent to as much as half 
the workforce.
The case of Yibin City is an extreme ex-
ample, however. In other regions, even when 
privatization takes the form of employee own-
ership, it is common that workers are reduced 
by a certain extent at the time of privatization, 
followed by post-privatization reductions in 
stages. Xindalu Radiator in Chengdu City cut 
its payroll by over 20% (100-plus employees) 
when it was turned into the employee-owned 
enterprise in 1998. At Jiangjin Confectionery 
in Jiangjin City and Yueliang Food in Dach-
uan City, about 30% of the workforce was re-
duced in a period of three to fi ve years after 
privatization.
In Sichuan Province, after the treat-
ment of redundant labor emerged as a major 
issue in privatization cases in Yibin City, the 
provincial government in 1996 enforced a le-
gal provision allowing part of revenue from 
the sale of state assets to be used for measures 
to cope with surplus workers. Under this pro-
vision, employees to be released became eli-
gible for the compensation equivalent to 10 
to 20% of their annual pay according to the 
length of service and other conditions. This 
formula has since spread widely to other re-
gions, prompting the central government to 
set standards for the calculation of compensa-
tion.
The sale of state-owned and collective 
enterprises to private-sector companies tend 
to involve relatively large personnel reduc-
tions. Meihao Food  was bought out on the 
condition that the privatized entity would 
take over only 150 of the former enterprise's 
400 employees. In the case of Shenghe Phar-
maceuticals, the company that bought it took 
over all the employees upon privatization, but 
later reduced about 40% of them in phases. 
Local governments often offer a deeper dis-
count in the sale price when purchasing com-
panies take over a relatively large number of 
employees. Employees not accepted by priva-
tized enterprises get reemployment support 
from local governments.
2.2.2 Post-Privatization Development
(1) Results of Privatization
Since there has been no systematic offi -
cial data published on privatization, we pres-
ent here tentative evaluation of the results of 
privatization based on our survey samples. 
Most of the visits to the companies in 
the survey were arranged by local govern-
ments, raising the possibility that the samples 
mostly represent enterprises with relatively fa-
vorable post-privatization performances. Any 
evaluation may need to take this potential fac-
tor into consideration.
Improved Performance after Privatization
Of the 24 survey samples, excluding the 
two enterprises that were scheduled for priva-
tization at the time of the survey, nine enter-
prises were performing strongly at the time of 
privatization, while the remaining 15 were ei-
ther turning in the average performance or 
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in deep diffi culties. Of the 15 enterprises, Ji-
angjin Confectionery and Suzhou Testing 
Equipment are still struggling, but 13 others 
have been able to improve their performance 
to varying degrees.
The improvement in earnings was par-
ticularly noticeable for enterprises privatized 
through the buyout or lease formulas (six out 
of 13). In all of these examples, the input of 
strong management resources of outside com-
panies, such as effective management, chan-
nels of sales and funding, resulted in the sig-
nifi cant improvement in performance. For 
Shenghe Pharmaceuticals and Changming 
Machinery, it appears that the reductions in 
outstanding debts all at once through bank-
ruptcy proceedings helped them make a ma-
jor turn for the better.
At the enterprises privatized through 
employee ownership, the effects on business 
performance were generally less dramatic 
than at those bought out or leased. At most 
of the employee-owned enterprises, manage-
ment teams were not replaced upon or after 
the privatization. Moreover, they had little to 
gain from job reductions by way of improving 
earnings. Despite these generally disadvanta-
geous conditions, however, seven of the eight 
enterprises that became employee-owned 
with the sub-par performance, excluding Ji-
angjin Confectionery suffering from the in-
dustry-wide slump, managed to improve their 
business to varying degrees. In particular, 
Fenghuang Packaging Materials and Yueliang 
Food achieved the rapid development of busi-
ness after their privatization in the fi rst half of 
the 1990s. 
How did they manage to improve their 
performance without the input of exter-
nal management resources or without major 
changes in the composition of personnel? To 
gain insight into the issue, we need to go back 
to the original signifi cance of privatization. 
Independence from Government Control and 
Strengthening of Management Discipline
The defeat of small and medium state-
owned and collective enterprises in compe-
tition with village and township enterpris-
es and other emerging enterprises stemmed 
from the lack of competitiveness in terms of 
cost and the fl exibility and mobility of man-
agement (see Chapter 1). Underlying these 
problems were inadequate incentives for both 
managers and employees of state-owned and 
collective enterprises. 
At pre-privatization state-owned enter-
prises, the distribution of income with differ-
entials among employees met strong inter-
nal resistance. Managers had less authority at 
the production lines, and it was not uncom-
mon that they failed to enforce a minimum 
of workplace discipline.17 Under the former 
state-owned enterprise system, they were able 
to count on the ultimate bailout by govern-
ment authorities in the event of business de-
terioration. Thus, managers and employees 
alike had few incentives to push for wid-
er wage differentials or the strengthening of 
workplace discipline. 
However, when small and medium state-
owned and collective enterprises found them-
selves in deeper diffi culties in the 1990s, 
county and other local governments oversee-
ing these enterprises were no longer capa-
ble of fully supporting them. This situation 
triggered the drive toward privatization, forc-
ing these enterprises, or more specifi cally, the 
groups of employees including managers, to 
become independent without relying on gov-
ernment support.
Privatization gave managers and em-
ployees the freedom of corporate manage-
ment, but also placed them in a situation 
where the lack of effi ciency would threaten 
the survival of their enterprises and hence 
employment. Therefore, privatized enterpris-
es, almost without an exception, took mea-
sures to reinforce incentives by widening 
wage differentials according to jobs and the 
quantity of work. It became easier for manag-
ers to have control over production lines to 
help enhance the effi ciency of production. 
The improvement of internal control com-
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bined with managers' abilities to achieve per-
formance improvements with little additional 
input of management resources. Managers of 
the sample enterprises are unanimous in the 
opinion that privatization brought about no-
ticeable improvements to the management in 
the workplace even when the improvement of 
earnings performance was less signifi cant af-
ter privatization due to inadequate restruc-
turing efforts or the industry-wide business 
slump (Weili Chemical Engineering and Yib-
in Electric Machinery) or when they still are 
unable to get out of diffi culties (Jiangjin Con-
fectionery and Suzhou Testing Equipment). 
Thus, it can be concluded that the separation 
from government control and the strength-
ened incentives for managers and employ-
ees were the most essential results of privatiza-
tion.
There is no question that the privatiza-
tion-induced improvement in effi ciency alone 
does not guarantee the survival and further 
development of enterprises. In Yibin Coun-
try, it was reported some privatized enterpris-
es already went bankrupt as early as in 1999. 
As more and more public enterprises become 
privatized, it is expected, privatization itself is 
increasingly likely to become less of a panacea 
for improved business performance.
(2) Limits on Privatization through Employee 
Ownership
Privatization through employee owner-
ship produced visible results in terms of im-
proved incentives through the severance of 
ties between government authorities and en-
terprises. This actually led to the improved 
business performance at many enterprises. 
However, in areas where privatization 
began earlier than others, like Yibin County 
and Zhucheng City, Shandong Province it be-
came obvious soon after privatization that the 
employee ownership with the relatively equal 
equity shares among employees have the seri-
ous problem regarding management effi cien-
cy.
At enterprises privatized through em-
ployee ownership, employees attend general 
meetings of shareholders as shareholders, get-
ting involved in management decision-mak-
ing. Given the relatively equal distribution of 
shares among employees, it is virtually impos-
sible to implement management policies that 
are not endorsed by a majority of employ-
ees. The problem, however, is the fact that 
managers/executives and employees do not 
infrequently share the same understanding 
and interests. In the eyes of managers, this 
represents a major obstacle to management 
effi ciency. Specifi cally, the following points 
are particularly problematic.
Constraints on Personnel Reduction Programs
As described earlier, even enterpris-
es privatized through employee ownership 
have cut the number of employees gradual-
ly. This is a major progress compared with the 
pre-privatization days when it was not so easy 
to dismiss even delinquent workers. Howev-
er, in comparison with enterprises bought by 
private companies, there is no denying that 
employee-owned enterprises do have greater 
constraints on personnel reductions.18 In the 
case of Jiangjin Confectionery, when manage-
ment proposed to introduce a system of ear-
ly retirement for men at the age of 50 and for 
women at the age of 40 as part of rationaliza-
tion to respond to intensifi ed market compe-
tition, the general meeting of shareholders, 
meaning employees, voted against the pro-
posal.
Lingering Egalitarianism
Even when privatization contributes to 
stronger management discipline, it is still dif-
fi cult to wipe out egalitarianism dating back 
to the years of state-owned enterprises as long 
as the equal equity ownership is in place. In 
this climate, even when managers/executives 
are playing a crucial role in the growth of en-
terprises, they cannot raise their own salaries 
substantially due to disapproval of employ-
ees, a possible major disincentive. Among the 
survey samples of employee-owned enterpris-
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es, managers of enterprises with good perfor-
mance, such as Fenghuang Packaging Materi-
als and Nanyang Electrical Engineering, were 
all the more aware of this particular problem. 
At these enterprises, salary differentials be-
tween managers and employees were just sev-
eral times, not much different from the lev-
els seen at state-owned enterprises. Salaries of 
managers of employee-owned enterprises are 
far lower than those of purely private compa-
nies. 
Problems with Appropriation of Earnings
Among the survey samples of employ-
ee-owned enterprises, those that made infor-
mation on dividend rates available all had the 
high dividend rates. From the standpoint of 
corporate management, managers natural-
ly want to keep as large internal reserves as 
possible by curbing an outfl ow of cash in or-
der to secure fi nancial buoyancy and prepare 
for long-term investment. From the stand-
point of employees as shareholders, it is only 
natural to demand dividends commensurate 
with risks they are taking. If the subject of div-
idend rates is put to a vote at a shareholders' 
meeting, employees prevail on the strength of 
numbers.19
Privatization through employee own-
ership had a measure of success in reform-
ing the ineffi cient way of management under 
state ownership. While management execu-
tives of the surveyed privatized enterprises ac-
knowledged this, they emphasized that the 
present ownership structure characterized by 
the near-equal equity distribution among em-
ployees is hampering effi cient decision-mak-
ing.20 With this perception deepening, the ad-
equacy of the employee ownership with equal 
equity participation has increasingly been 
called into question.
(3) Developments toward Concentration of 
Ownership
In Sichuan Province, the adverse ef-
fects of the employee ownership with equal 
equity participation came to be recognized 
by around 1995-1996, and moves emerged 
toward the concentration of ownership on 
managers/executives. However, managers of 
employee-owned enterprises would risk their 
positions if the confrontation with employees 
comes into the open. Moreover, employees at 
enterprises with good business performance 
would not relinquish their equity shares easi-
ly because of high dividends they can expect 
to receive. So, managers are very discreet in 
their approach to the problem.
Holley Group provides an interesting 
example of success in ownership concentra-
tion.21 The predecessor of Holley Group was 
a small collective enterprise established in the 
1970s. It turned itself into a maker of electric 
meters later, and became the industry lead-
er with remarkable growth under the present 
manager that took the helm in 1987. In 1995, 
Holley Group was designated by Zhejiang 
Province as the model of the enterprise sys-
tem modernization and converted itself into a 
joint stock company. In the reform of the en-
terprise at the time, the local government of 
Yuhang took an equity share of 30%, with the 
remaining 70% being owned almost equally 
by employees.
With the adverse effects of the em-
ployee ownership with equal equity distribu-
tion becoming apparent later, Holley Group 
launched into the "second reform" designed 
to promote the centralization of capital. A 
holding company was established with the in-
vestment by a group of 127 core employees 
hand-picked by the manager, and this holding 
company bought back shares held by the lo-
cal government and employees in stages. The 
repurchase program encountered strong re-
sistance from employees, and the manager of-
ten had to directly persuade employees to sell 
their holdings. After two years from 1998, the 
share repurchase program was completed in 
2001, with the manager owning 20% and the 
core employees 80% to make the enterprise a 
purely private entity. 
Lida Textile is another example that 
successfully realized the equity control by 
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managers/executives by implementing the 
"second reform" in a similar way with Holley 
Group. The two enterprises had two things in 
common in their successful second reforms: 
the present management teams played a de-
cisive role in overcoming the past fi nancial 
crises and turning their enterprises around 
to become excellent companies and that the 
very strong earnings performance allowed 
them to offer higher prices for the repur-
chase of shares owned by employees.
Compared with these two exceptionally 
successful enterprises, other privatized enter-
prises have to take more time and cautiously 
proceed with ownership concentration plans. 
Yibin Food, Weili Chemical Engineering and 
Nanyang Electrical Engineering are among 
the enterprises that sought or are planning 
to seek the concentration of employee-owned 
shares through separate companies or share-
holding funds established by groups of core 
employees. Another method of ownership 
concentration is the allocation of newly issued 
shares to managers/executives (the case of 
Yibin Electric Machinery).
In the latter half of the 1990s, local gov-
ernments pushing ahead with privatization 
programs also came to recognize the adverse 
effects of the employee ownership with equal 
equity distribution, prompting a shift in priva-
tization policies. Among the survey samples 
of the more recently privatized enterprises, 
the proportion of employee-owned enterpris-
es with equal equity distribution declined rel-
ative to the privatization cases involving the 
buyout by managers/executives and core em-
ployees or the sale to outside companies (see 
Table 3 above). It can be safely assumed that 
the surveyed cases more or less represent a 
national trend. The central government also 
made a policy shift in 1998, regarding the 
buyout by competent managers/executives 
as well as private companies as an important 
means of privatization of small and medium 
enterprises. Thus, privatization of small and 
medium state-owned and collective enterpris-
es entered a new phase.
2.3 Dynamics of Ownership Trans-
formation
2.3.1 Implementation Process of 
Privatization
This chapter examined the overall 
trend of privatization of small and medium 
state-owned and collective enterprises in the 
1990s, and based mainly on the survey sam-
ples, made an analysis of the specifi c exam-
ples and characteristics of privatization as well 
as post-privatization developments. On the 
basis of the results of the analysis, this section 
looks at the logic of privatization of small and 
medium enterprises in China below.
At fi rst, the acquisition by employee 
groups was the priority method of privatiza-
tion over the sale to outside interests because 
of the circumstances described below. 
Deficiency of Private-sector Capital??Regions 
that embarked on privatization earlier were 
mostly economically underdeveloped regions, 
including Yibin City and Dachuan City, and 
there were few private-sector business con-
cerns capable of buying out state-owned or 
collective enterprises then since the develop-
ment of private-sector businesses itself was still 
in the incipient stage.
Information Asymmetry??There was the great 
asymmetry of information available to insid-
ers and outsiders on the real business condi-
tions of state-owned or collective enterprises. 
This meant enormous risks for outside capital 
in the buyout of publicly-owned enterprises.
Avoidance of Employment Problems ?It was al-
ways possible that the sale of state-owned or 
collective enterprises to private companies 
would require massive personnel reductions. 
Thus, both employees and local governments 
at fi rst tended to repulse privatization ideas.
Ideological Constraints ?There were big ideo-
logical impediments to the sale of state-owned 
or collective enterprises to private companies 
because it meant private ownership both in 
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name and in substance. On the other hand, 
employee ownership, which was regarded a 
type of "public ownership," posed few ideo-
logical problems.
For employees of enterprises being 
privatized, privatization meant the loss of vest-
ed interests they had been enjoying as work-
ers at state-owned enterprises, the biggest of 
them being job guarantee. Besides, the pur-
chase of equity shares in enterprises with de-
teriorating performance, even though they 
were their employers, involved big risks. Un-
der these circumstances, pro-privatization lo-
cal governments, as a measure to help ease 
employees' resistance against privatization, 
opted for deep discounts in sale prices to pro-
mote employee ownership.22
For local governments, employee own-
ership was the realistic option to carry out 
privatization. Privatization that was realized 
after these developments produced visible ef-
fects in improving the performance of priva-
tized enterprises. Privatization achieved the 
fi rst objective of the separation between gov-
ernment authorities and enterprises.
2.3.2 Post-Privatization Readjust-
ment
Although the separation between ad-
ministration and enterprises was the great ac-
complishment of privatization, for employ-
ee-owned enterprises, privatization in no way 
meant the completion of corporate reform. 
By getting rid of the fetters of government 
control, enterprises were at last allowed to 
follow an autonomous process in earnest to 
choose an optimal corporate system.
Problems with employee ownership 
came to the fore immediately after privatiza-
tion was implemented. Relative to corporate 
managers and executives, ordinary employ-
ees usually do not have suffi cient informa-
tion on the status of business, particularly in-
formation on future prospects of enterprises. 
In addition, given the low levels of income, 
employees tend to be very risk-averse. Under 
these circumstances, it is only natural for em-
ployees, as shareholders, to demand high div-
idends on their investment. From the stand-
point of managers/executives, however, the 
payout of high dividends means nothing less 
than an outfl ow of cash fl ows that are other-
wise available for investment in the future. 
A similar clash of views could arise regard-
ing salaries of managers/executives. All these 
things reinforced the desire on the part of 
managers/executives to establish a fi rm grip 
on management through the concentration 
of ownership, if conditions permitted.
In the early stage of privatization, 
managers/executives would have faced dif-
fi culty in raising enough capital in their at-
tempts to control capital of privatized enter-
prises. But the situation gradually changed to 
make it possible to raise buyout funds through 
formal and informal channels of fi nanc-
ing. In the case of Holley Group, managers/
executives were able to procure share pur-
chase funds for the fi rst-stage privatization 
in 1995 from a local fi nancial institution. In 
the case of Suzhou Testing Equipment, the 
top manager borrowed a massive amount of 
one million RMB from a friend and entrepre-
neur to achieve controlling share of equity. As 
these examples indicate, with the increasing 
availability of various fi nancing means, it has 
become no longer impossible for managers/
executives to buy out even relatively large en-
terprises with payrolls in excess of 1,000.
As the momentum began to build up 
for ownership concentration in the hands of 
managers/executives at employee-owned en-
terprises, local governments also began to en-
courage the buyout by competent managers/
executives or private companies in new 
privatization cases.
Flexible and agile management is the 
lifeline of small and medium enterprises. 
Thus, the most suitable management method 
is the corporate system that combines owner-
ship and control, giving the top manager or a 
select group of executives the ultimate right 
to make management decisions as sharehold-
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ers. The great majority of small and medium 
enterprises in the market economy are own-
er-controlled enterprises where the top man-
ager and close associates or relatives exert di-
rect control over capital. The trend toward 
concentration of ownership in privatization of 
small and medium enterprises in China can 
be described as refl ecting "natural law," so to 
speak, in favor of the convergence of owner-
ship and control.
2.3.3 Centralization and Decentral-
ization of Capital
However, it is necessary to note that 
the post-privatization reorganization of small 
and medium enterprises in China involves as-
pects that cannot be simply described as de-
velopments toward owner-controlled enter-
prises. In the "second reform" initiatives at 
Holley Group and Lida Textile, the top man-
agers who were successful in business rehabil-
itation and in turning the privatized entities 
around as excellent enterprises earned them-
selves the status of de facto owner-managers, 
while a number of management executives 
and core employees also took part in the buy-
out. At other enterprises seeking recentraliza-
tion of capital and enterprises privatized in 
relatively recent years, all managers plan to 
establish or established control of capital in 
association with other management members 
and core employees. The size of core groups 
that centralized capital varies from enterprise 
to enterprise, but in most cases, a portion of 
several percentage points of all employees 
participate in the centralization of capital as 
key players.
The alliance between top managers and 
executives/core employees may prove a tran-
sient phenomenon in the process of priva-
tization. But some top managers regard the 
shared ownership by executives and core em-
ployees in more positive light. As long as en-
terprises exist as joint stock companies or pri-
vate limited companies, top managers need 
to disclose detailed management informa-
tion to share-holding management execu-
tives and core employees. By letting execu-
tives and core employees share privileged 
management information, which is usually re-
served for owner-managers and their close as-
sociates at purely owner-controlled enterpris-
es, top managers hope to enhance their sense 
of involvement in management. Since top 
managers, though they may be top sharehold-
ers, tend not to control a majority of equity 
stakes, executives and core employees can ex-
pect to hold top managers in check as long 
once they form alliance. If some sense of con-
fi dence can be built under these circumstanc-
es, it may prove benefi cial to top managers as 
well.23 Following the similar logic, some pure-
ly privately-held companies are starting to in-
troduce stock ownership plans for executives 
and employees.
Conclusion: Future Prospects
The policy switch by the CPC that pro-
gressively occurred from the late 1990s 
through 2001 all but eliminated political con-
straints over privatization of small and me-
dium state-owned and collective enterprises. 
In parallel with this development, local gov-
ernments also proactively pushed ahead with 
privatization of public enterprises. Recent sta-
tistics show the slowing decline in the number 
of state-owned enterprises, raising the possi-
bility that further progress in the privatization 
drive has hit a snag in such areas as disposal 
of debts and personnel reductions. Amid con-
tinuously intensifying market competition, 
however, most publicly owned enterprises, un-
less privatized, are expected to be forced out 
of the market through bankruptcies. In that 
direction, the process of privatization of small 
and medium enterprises in China is highly 
likely to be completed in the not-so-distant fu-
ture.
The focus of privatization is likely to 
shift to public enterprises of larger scale go-
ing forward. In the embryonic market econ-
omy as China's, innovative abilities of cor-
24 Beyond Market Socialism
porate managers can play an enormously 
important role in the development of enter-
prises. Among large state-owned and collec-
tive enterprises that have gained prominence 
through market competition, there are not a 
few where management powers have been sig-
nifi cantly concentrated in the hands of top 
managers. The dynamics of capital central-
ization seen in the process of privatization of 
small and medium enterprises is expected to 
become a crucial factor in the privatization of 
manager-controlled large enterprises as well.
(Ken-ichi IMAI)
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